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Wage Dynamics Network 
 
This paper contains research conducted within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The WDN is a 
research network consisting of economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks (NCBs) of the EU countries. The WDN aims at studying in depth the features and sources of wage 
and labour cost dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. The specific objectives of the network 
are: i) identifying the sources and features of wage and labour cost dynamics that are most relevant for 
monetary policy and ii) clarifying the relationship between wages, labour costs and prices both at the firm 
and macro-economic level.  
 
 
The refereeing process of this paper has been co-ordinated by a team composed of Gabriel Fagan (ECB, 
Bihan (Banque de France) and Thomas Mathä (Banque centrale du Luxembourg). 
 
form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper 
are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the ESCB. 
The paper is released in order to make the results of WDN research generally available, in preliminary 
The WDN is chaired by Frank Smets (ECB). Giuseppe Bertola (Università di Torino) and Julián Messina 
chairperson), Philip Vermeulen (ECB), Giuseppe Bertola, Julián Messina, Jan Babecký (CNB), Hervé Le 
(World Bank and University of Girona) act as external consultants and Ana Lamo (ECB) as Secretary. 3
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Survey results in 15 European countries for almost 15,000 firms reveal that Belgian firms react 
more than the average European firm to adverse shocks by reducing permanent and temporary 
employment. On the basis of a firm-level analysis, this paper confirms that the different reaction 
to shocks is significant and investigates what factors explain this difference. Although the 
explanatory value of the variables is limited, most of the explanatory power of the model being 
associated with the dummy variables coding for firm size, sector and country, the variables 
investigated provide valuable information. The importance of wage bargaining above the firm 
level, the automatic system of index-linking wages to past inflation, the limited use of flexible pay, 
the high share of low-skilled blue-collar workers, the labor intensive production process as well as 
the less stringent legislation with respect to the protection against dismissal are at the basis of the 
stronger employment reaction of Belgian firms. On the contrary, employment is safeguarded by 
the presence of many small firms and a wage cushion. 
 
 
Key Words: survey, wage rigidity, cost-push shocks, demand shock, wage bargaining institutions, 
  indexation 
JEL Classification:  D21, E30, J31 5
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Survey results in 15 European countries reveal that, compared with the "average" European firm, 
Belgian firms prefer to adjust permanent and temporary employment when they are hit by adverse 
shocks. This paper investigates what factors explain this difference, by testing the adjustment 
channel used by firms in reaction to two cost-push shocks, namely an increase in the cost of 
intermediate inputs and a general rise in labor costs, and to a negative demand shock. Do they 
adjust prices? Costs? Or a mixture of both? In the case of a cost adjustment, the choice between a 
reduction of (base or flexible) wages, permanent employment, temporary employment, hours 
worked or non-labor costs is investigated.  
 
Firstly, our analysis reveals that, in response to cost-push shocks, 65 % of European firms will 
adjust both prices and costs. 14 % of firms will only adjust prices, 11 % of them will only reduce 
costs, while the remaining 10 % will use another strategy. A pure price-adjustment strategy is more 
likely, and therefore a pure cost reduction is in most cases less likely, if the labor cost share is high, 
in firms employing many (low-skilled) blue-collar workers, in small companies and when wages are 
rigid. On the contrary, firms are less inclined to adopt a pure price-adjustment strategy, and more 
likely to reduce prices and costs, if they face high competition. Belgian firms behave more or less 
the same. Overall, European and Belgian survey findings suggest that flexible wages reduce the 
likelihood that (cost) shocks will be passed on to prices. 
 
Secondly, firms that respond to a shock by adjusting costs do so mostly by reducing non-labor 
costs. The survey analysis reveals that 27 % of European firms will reduce employment, while the 
remaining 17 % will cut flexible wages or working time. An employment reaction is more likely in 
firms facing (real) wage rigidities linked to the existence of wage-setting institutions, such as 
collective wage agreements signed outside the firm, policies that adapt changes in wages to 
indexation (only for a demand shock), and a high share of employees covered by collective 
agreements, as well as in firms active in a highly competitive and labor-intensive environment and 
employing many low-skilled blue collars. Besides, a high share of temporary employees increases 
the likelihood of a reduction in temporary employment, while it protects permanent employment. 
Jobs are also safeguarded by a large share of flexible pay in total wages. Firms operating in 
construction, trade and market services, as well as small firms, are also less likely to cut back on 
temporary employment. These results are of course conditional on the fact that the shock is not so 
large that it would push the firm out of the market. 
 
Most of these findings go some way towards explaining the stronger employment reaction of 
Belgian firms (37 % of firms will cut employment) compared to the average of countries participating 
in the survey (27 %). Belgian companies are indeed characterized by a larger share of above-firm-
level collective wage agreements, an automatic system of index-linking wages to past inflation, a 
high share of employees covered by collective agreements, a low share of flexible wages, slightly 
higher labor intensity and many low-skilled blue collars in their workforce, compared to the average 
of the 15 countries. As for the blue-collar workers, a reduction in the number of hours worked is also 
more likely, because the system of temporary unemployment protects workers against dismissal in 
the initial phase of the shock. Even though the share of temporary employment is low in Belgium, its 
use is widespread and adjustment costs are low compared to permanent employment. Therefore, 
many firms use flexible employment as a buffer to absorb unexpected shocks. The presence of 
many small firms in Belgium also tends to safeguard employment. A test of some country-specific 
control variables reveals that employment is further protected by the presence of a wage cushion, 
i.e. the difference between wages actually paid and the scales fixed by the collective wage 
agreements. 
 
After controlling for the impact of the variables mentioned above, the difference between the 
employment response to shocks of firms in Belgium and that of other countries remains significant. 
In order to explain the remaining cross-country differences, the probability of adjusting wages, 
permanent employment or temporary employment is regressed on a set of variables observed at 
the national level. The results reveal that the more stringent the legislation with respect to the 
protection against dismissals, the more firms adjust wages and the less they tend to adjust 
permanent employment, with temporary employment contracts acting as a buffer in response to an 
adverse shock. As the legislation is less strict in Belgium, it helps to explain the larger reaction of 
permanent employment to shocks in Belgian firms. 
Non-technical summary 6
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A firm-level survey on wage-setting conducted in Belgium in the context of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN)1, 
reveals that, in response to adverse shocks (unexpected demand fall, intermediate input price rise or wage increase), 
almost 50% of firms reduce costs by cutting employment. 
 
The fact that adjustment mainly goes through employment in Belgian firms, is also found in Fuss (2009). A 
decomposition of the wage bill at the firm level shows that (i) the major part of wage bill variation is associated to 
labor fluctuations and (ii) wage bill contractions often result from employment contraction, while wages continue to 
increase. Besides, Fuss and Wintr (2009) analyze the elasticity of firms' real labor compensation and employment to 
idiosyncratic and sectoral productivity shocks. They find that in both cases the elasticity of employment is large. 
Besides, the elasticity of wages to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is very low, but it is much higher in the case of a 
sectoral productivity shock.  
 
Similar surveys on wage-setting have been conducted in 14 other European countries2. On average, for the total group 
of 15 countries, the employment strategy is used by one third of firms. This rich database allows us to investigate on 
the key question of this paper, namely why are Belgian firms using more intensively (relative to other European firms) 
the employment channel in response to adverse shocks? To our knowledge, no empirical comparison exists of the 
reaction of Belgian and other European firms to adverse shocks. Some pieces of information can be found in 
Bertola et al. (2010) but their focus is not on the Belgian situation. They analyze the global results of the WDN-wage-
setting survey with respect to price versus cost and wage versus employment adjustments in response to cost-push 
shocks, finding that the intensity and character of the adjustment depends on the intensity of competition, the 
importance of collective bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and their environment. 
We use this paper as a benchmark but focus in our analysis on country differences, more specifically on the reaction of 
Belgian firms versus other European firms, and we extend the set of explanatory variables. Besides, we also exploit the 
information on the demand shock. 
 
Using the same dataset as in Bertola et al. (2010), namely the pooled results of the WDN wage-setting survey in 15 
countries, we construct a set of explanatory variables. As in Hall (2005), we first considered a set of variables 
measuring or driving wage rigidity. This set includes direct measures of downward wage rigidity computed in the 
context of the WDN (Babecký et al., 2009a and Du Caju et al., 2009) and several indirect measures of wage rigidity 
relating to labor market institutions, such as the presence of indexation. The latter were chosen on the basis of the 
conclusions of Dickens et al. (2007) and Babecký et al. (2009a), namely that national labor market institutions explain 
differences in downward wage rigidity measured at the microeconomic level. 
 
We also included in our dataset some firm specific characteristics such as size and labor force composition following 
Messina et al. (2010), who investigate the role of firm and work force characteristics in shaping wage rigidities at the 
sector level. 
 
Finally, the set of potential explanatory variables has been completed with several measures of employment 
flexibility, such as the share of part time and temporary employment, the employment turnover, and indicators of 
employment protection, and, following Bertola et al. (2010), measures of product market competition and labor 
intensity. 
 
After controlling for the impact of all variables mentioned above, the differences in employment response of Belgian 
firms to shocks compared to other countries remains significant. Country dummies related to employment protection 
legislation provide additional explanation for the remaining cross-country differences. Focusing on the Belgian 
situation, we also added some specific Belgian information. 
 
The remaining structure of the paper is as follow. In Section 2, we describe the dataset and the methodology used. 
Next, we analyze in Section 3 the pooled dataset, with a special focus on differences between countries in their firms' 
responses to the two cost-push shocks. In section 4, we restrict our analysis to the Belgian sample and try to find some 
common characteristics of Belgian firms that might explain their response to cost-push shocks. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                                 
1   The WDN is an ESCB/Eurosystem research network studying the features and sources of wage and labor cost dynamics in EU 
countries. 
2  AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI. 7
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2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1.   THE DATASET 
 
In this paper, we use a harmonized and pooled dataset of survey results for 15 European countries. The survey 
contains questions on wage and price-setting behavior at the firm level. It was conducted by 15 national central banks 
in the context of the WDN. The sample covers almost 15,000 firms employing more than 5 employees and operating 
in manufacturing, construction, trade, market services and financial intermediation. The sample can be split up in four 
size classes (5 to 19 employees, 20 to 49 employees, 50 to 199 employees and 200 and more employees) and total 
employment at the firm level could be allocated to four occupational groups (low skilled blue collars, high skilled blue 
collars, low skilled white collars and high skilled white collars). More details on the sample and a description of all 
survey results can be found in ECB (2009). 
 
Table 1 - Sample structure by country 
   Number of firms  Percentage of total 
AT  548  3.7 
BE  1,420  9.5 
CZ  399  2.7 
EE  366  2.5 
ES  1,769  11.8 
FR  2,011  13.5 
GR  401  2.7 
HU  1,959  13.1 
IE  848  5.7 
IT  952  6.4 
LT  333  2.2 
NL  1,068  7.2 
PL  896  6.0 
PT  1,320  8.8 
SI  650  4.4 
Total  14,940  100.0 
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
 
The Belgian dataset, which is part of the pooled database, comprises 1,420 firms. The Belgian questionnaire has been 
completely harmonized in accordance with the common questionnaire, drawn up by the WDN in consultation with all 
participating countries3. Nonetheless, some specific questions were added, e.g. concerning the wages cushion, i.e. the 
buffer between the wages actually paid and the pay scales at the sector level, and concerning the automatic wage 
indexation mechanism. A detailed description of the Belgian survey sample and the results can be found in 
Druant et al. (2008). Moreover, country-specific information has been used to complement the analysis, namely a 
measure for downward real wage rigidity based on the distribution of wage changes and a profit elasticity measure 
provided by Du Caju et al. (2009). 
 
The common questionnaire contains information on how firms respond to three different adverse shocks, particularly 
a negative demand shock, an increase in the cost of intermediate inputs, or a general rise in labor costs. All three 
shocks are unexpected. The cost-push shocks affect all firms in the market in a similar way. Only the wage shock is of a 
permanent nature. Firms had to tick the relevance (choosing between "not relevant", "of little relevance", "relevant" 
and "very relevant") of four different strategies: reduce/increase prices, reduce margins, cut production and reduce 
(other) costs. 
 
Firms which attached any relevance to cost adjustment were also asked what strategy they pursued. For all three 
shocks, a choice had to be made between six options (except for the wage shock, where the first option is not 
                                                                 
3   The common questionnaire can be found in Druant et al. (2009), the Belgian questionnaire is available in Druant et al. (2008). 8
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relevant): reduce base wages, reduce flexible wages, reduce the number of permanent employees, reduce the 
number of temporary employees, and reduce the number of hours worked or reduce non-labor costs.4 
 
Based on the individual responses to the questions on how firms respond to the three adverse shocks, we have 
constructed the "Choice 1" variable. 
 
This variable takes values 0, 1, 2 and 3. It takes value 1 if the firm responded that only a price adjustment is relevant in 
response to the shock considered (either "of little relevance", "relevant" or "very relevant"); it takes value 2 if the firm 
responded that only a cost adjustment is relevant ("of little relevance", "relevant" or "very relevant"); it takes value 3 
if both price and cost adjustments are relevant ("of little relevance", "relevant" or "very relevant"); and it takes value 0 
otherwise. We did not consider the "Reduce margin" as a true choice as, either it is the result of a decision to adjust 
prices or costs or it is the result of a decision not to adjust price or costs. Therefore, the computation of the "Choice 1" 
variable does not take into account the degree of relevance of "Reduce margins". 
 
Furthermore, we have constructed a second indicator variable, named "Choice 2" which codes the answers to the 
questions on the cost-reduction strategies. This variable has only been computed when the cost-reduction strategy 
was relevant for the firm (Choice 1 = 2 or 3) and when the firm chooses only one cost-reduction strategy. Multiple 
responses were discarded.5 
 
This variable takes values 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, based on their main cost-reduction strategy. It takes value 1 if the firm 
chooses to reduce wages (either the base wage or the flexible wage); it takes value 2 if it reduces the number of 
permanent employees; it takes value 3 if it reduces the number of temporary employees; it takes value 4 if it reduces 
the number of hours worked; and, finally, it takes value 5 if the firm reduces non-labor costs. 
 
Reductions of base wages were merged with reductions of flexible wages because very few firms (mostly located in 
Greece) ticked the first option. Descriptive evidence on this will be presented in Section 3.1 (figure 1). Moreover, it 
was not a relevant response in the case of a wage shock. 
 
The response to the three types of shocks, reflected in the "Choice 1" and "Choice 2" variables is subsequently 
confronted to a set of explanatory variables described in the next section. 
 
2.2.  THE VARIABLES 
 
As mentioned above, the main focus of this paper is to investigate why the adjustment to shocks in Belgium mainly 
goes through employment, more than in other European countries. A second part of the analysis focuses on the 
Belgian sample and tries to distinguish some common features of Belgian firms with respect to the way they react to 
shocks. Both the "international analysis" and the "Belgian analysis" are based on a similar set of explanatory variables, 
excluding some exceptions that will be discussed in Section 4. Almost all of them are calculated on the basis of 
information extracted from the survey.6 They can be grouped into six categories: measures of wage rigidity, 
composition of the workforce, intensity of product market competition, labor intensity, price flexibility and sector, size 
and country indicator variables. 
 
MEASURES OF WAGE RIGIDITY  
  Rigid real wages are identified by Hall (2005) as an important cause of larger employment reactions to adverse shocks. 
Therefore, we have constructed a set of explanatory variables measuring or driving wage rigidity. This set includes 
direct and indirect measures of wage rigidity relating to labor market institutions, such as the presence of nominal 
wage indexation, following Dickens et al. (2007) and Babecký et al. (2009a). 
 
                                                                 
4   All participating countries have surveyed firms' responses to those three shocks, except Ireland for which firms' response to the 
wage shock has not been investigated. In the case of Spain, the possible answers to the question on the reaction to a demand 
shock were formulated in a slightly different way; hence, some corrections (see table notes) had to be done. 
5  Missing values and discarded responses amounted to +/- 1,500 observations per shock in the total sample and to +/- 110 
observations per shock in the Belgian sample. 
6   A detailed list of the variables used in both analyses, together with their definition, is provided in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 9
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A first direct measure of downward nominal wage rigidity is computed on the basis of the survey question "Has the 
base wage been frozen over the last five years?". It is defined as a dummy variable that takes value of 1 is the answer 
to this question is "yes" and 0 otherwise.7 
 
We do not have direct information with respect to downward real wage rigidity, but we can observe the existence of a 
policy that links wage changes to inflation. Following Babecký et al. (2009a), we consider that a firm faces downward 
real wage rigidity if an automatic link between wages and past or expected inflation exists. 
 
To account for labor market institutions other than indexation mechanisms, our set of explanatory variables also 
includes the presence/absence of collective wage agreements. While collective agreements signed at the national, 
regional, sector or occupational levels (referred to as collective agreements signed outside the firm) are generally 
considered to enhance wage rigidity, decentralized wage bargaining by means of collective wage agreements at the 
firm level may reduce downward real wage rigidity (Messina et al., 2010). 
 
Finally, our set of explanatory variables also includes variables with respect to labor force composition and firm's 
characteristics (as in Messina et al., 2010). 
 
COMPOSITION OF THE WORKFORCE 
 
Regarding the skill composition, the labor force is allocated into four categories: low skilled blue collars, high skilled 
blue collars, low skilled white collars, and high skilled white collars. Messina et al. (2010) find a higher rigidity for high 
skilled workers. The theory of human capital explains that the higher the human capital of employees and the higher a 
firm's investment in those workers, the more difficult and costly it is to replace them. Having these turnover costs in 
mind, firms do not want these employees to leave and, hence, they are also less inclined to cut their wages. The same 
theory can explain the higher wage rigidity for white collars relative to blue collars found in Babecký et al. (2009a). 
Employment adjustment is also enhanced by the presence of a high share of part time employment and a high share 
of temporary employment. 
 
INTENSITY OF PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
 
Bertola et al. (2010) found that competition increases the likelihood of wage and employment responses to shocks. 
According to them, the reaction depends essentially on the elasticity of demand at the firm levelthe elasticity of labor 
demand being expected to be larger in a competitive environment. However, Babecký et al. (2009a) find that sectors 
with stronger competition experience higher downward nominal wage rigidity. This is explained by wage-bargaining 
practices: firms in competitive sectors generally earn less profit and, hence, wages actually paid are close to pay 
scales, leaving less room for downward adjustment. Employees of firms facing less competition, on the other hand, try 
to appropriate part of the higher rents, sometimes by means of a firm-level agreement. Wages effectively paid in 
those sectors are above pay scales and thus more flexible. According to their results, a higher competition is expected 
to enhance a reaction in employment, while wages are rigid. Considering the information provided by the survey, the 
intensity of competitive pressures is computed on the basis of the question "To what extent will the firm follow a price 




To measure labor intensity, we consider the share of labor costs in total costs. Similar to the degree of product market 
competition, this variable is expected to positively affect the wage and employment responses to shocks 
(Bertola et al., 2010). 
 
   
                                                                 
7   This is a rough measure of downward nominal wage rigidity. If we consider the case of an expanding firm operating in a 
favourable economic environment that faces no shocks, the absence of wage freezes will not be a sign of wage rigidity. 10
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For the analysis of variable "Choice 1"8, we also consider a measure of price flexibility. The survey provides several 
indications in this respect. A simple measure of price flexibility would be the frequency of price changes. However, as 
more than one quarter of firms report to have "no pattern" in price changes, too many observations would be lost. 
Moreover, the frequency of price changes is a rather rough measure of price flexibility: if there is no reason to change 
prices, frequency will be low without being a sign of rigidity (Dhyne et al., 2007). Therefore, an alternative measure 
has been used, namely the number of firms stating that price changes are not concentrated in particular months. The 
absence of time-dependent price-setting strategies, or, vice versa, the fact that price setting is state-dependent, is 
considered to be a sign of lower price rigidity. 
 
SECTOR, SIZE AND COUNTRY 
 
Finally, we also considered a set of additional control variables for other firm's characteristics. We considered 
indicator variables related to the sector of activity (manufacturing=reference sector, construction, trade, market 
services and financial intermediation), to the size of the firm, approximated by the number of employees (5-19, 20-49, 
50-199 and 200 and more=reference group) and, for the international analysis, to the country where the firm is 
located (Belgium=reference country). 
 
In Table 2, weighted averages of all the variables mentioned above are presented. These data give an overview of the 
position of Belgium compared to the average of the 15 countries and the total of euro area countries covered by the 




For the international analysis, alternative specifications have been tested, extending the set of explanatory variables 
with the share of employees covered by a collective agreement and the share of the wage bill related to individual or 
company performance. The additional information contained in the former variable, compared to the existence of 
collective wage agreements at any level, is that it takes into account if the agreements cover all employees or only 
part of them. A high coverage might be a sign of high wage rigidity, although if most agreements are signed at the firm 
level, it could be a sign of low wage rigidity (see above). Messina et al. (2010) find a positive relation between flexible 
pay structures and nominal wage flexibility. Bonuses and other kinds of flexible pay can be more easily adapted to the 
firms' situation. Because of low response rates to the survey questions investigating on both variables, a large amount 
of observations is lost when these variables are included in the analysis. For this reason, we do not report detailed 
results in the paper, but we mention them where relevant. This alternative specification was not used in the Belgian 
analysis, the loss of observations being too high to have significant results. 
 
Other variables have been considered, but were not maintained in the analysis, due to the large share of missing 
values. They relate to the intensity of competition, namely the fact whether or not the firm is price-taker for its main 
product and the share of sales in foreign markets. 
 
   
                                                                 
8   This variable summarizes the response of firms with respect to the relevance of the "adjust only prices", "reduce only costs" 
and "adjust both prices and costs" strategies in response to an unexpected adverse shock. 11
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Table 2 - Explanatory variables: Belgium versus the other countries 
(percentages) 
Variables  BE  Average of 15 
countries
1 







Low skilled blue collar
3  49.6  41.2  39.7  - 
High skilled blue collar
3  16.7  23.4  25.2  + 
Low skilled white collar
3  18.2  14.8  14.7  - 
High skilled white collar
3  15.5  18.4  18.7  + 
Manufacturing  45.8  41.5  43.1  ? 
Construction  14.8  7.6  6.9  ? 
Trade  20.9  20.6  19.2  ? 
Market services  16.7  28.0  28.6  ? 
Financial intermediation  1.8  2.2  2.2  ? 
5-19 employees  40.5  26.2  27.6  ? 
20-49 employees  26.5  22.9  21.9  ? 
50-199 employees  23.2  30.3  28.7  ? 
200 employees and more  9.7  20.7  21.9  ? 
Policy that adapts changes in base wages to 
inflation  98.2  32.5  30.7  + 
Share of permanent part time employment  17.1  19.6  19.3  + 
Share of temporary employment  2.7  10.2  10.4  + 
Importance of labor costs in total costs  37.5  35.0  35.6  + 
Very likely or likely to follow a competitor's 
price cut
4  29.3  58.1  55.9  + 
Collective agreement at the firm level  34.7  32.7  35.4  - 
Collective agreement signed outside the firm   98.3  65.8  87.6  + 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years?  12.6  11.8  10.9  + 
Price flexibility: price changes are not 
concentrated in particular month(s)  69.9  65.1  58.4  ? 
Employees covered by a collective 
agreement
5  89.1  60.0  77.3  +/- 
Share of wage bill related to individual or 
company performance
4  7.7  12.6  12.1  - 
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled excluding missing answers. 
1 AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI. 
2 AT, BE, ES, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI. 
3 Total of occupational groups can be different from 100%, as some countries included the category "other" in their questionnaire. 
4 The response rate to this question was very low in Belgium (less than 40%). 




After controlling for the impact of all explanatory variables mentioned above, we have tried to explain the remaining 
cross-country differentials with respect to the reaction of employment in response to shocks, by five indicators, 
computed on the basis of information from the OECD and Tonin (2005). Three of them relate to the strictness of 
employment protection legislation, ranging from 0 to 4, according to the increasing degree of stringency. They capture 
the flexibility/rigidity of employment on the country level. Other country-specific characteristics can be at the origin of 
different reactions in employment, such as the implicit tax rate on labor, expressed in percentages of labor costs, or 
the net replacement ratio of unemployment benefits, expressed as a percentage of the last wage. A detailed list is 
given in Appendix 3. Table 3 provides an overview of the relative position of Belgium compared to the average of the 
15 countries and the total of euro area countries covered by the survey. 
   12
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Table 3 - Country dummies: Belgium versus the other countries 
(percentages, unless otherwise stated) 







Overall strictness of protection against 
dismissals (regular employment) 
(2003)
3 
1.7  2.5  2.5 
Overall strictness of temporary 
employment regulation (2003)
 3  2.6  2.2  2.6 
Overall strictness of  regulation on 
collective dismissals (2003)
 3  4.1  3.2  3.2 
Implicit tax rate on labor (2006)  42.8  36.6  36.3 
Net replacement rate of a single 
person in the initial phase of 
unemployment (2006)
4 
57.0  60.3  61.5 
Sources: EC (2009), OECD (2004 and 2006), Tonin (2005). 
Unweighted results. 
1 AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI. 
2 AT, BE, ES, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI. 
3 Average of values ranging from 0 to 4, according to increasing degree of strictness. 
4 Not available for EE, LT and SI. 
 
2.3.  THE MODEL 
  As mentioned above, in order to model firms' strategies in response to unexpected adverse shocks, we considered 
firstly the "Choice 1" variable. This variable indicates that a firm adjusts only its prices (takes value 1), only its costs 
(takes value 2), both prices and costs (takes value 3) or none of those (takes value 0) in response to a shock (demand, 
input price or wage). 
 
This multiple choice variable is modeled using a multinomial Logit model. 
 
Therefore, the probability that firm i chooses option k (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) in response to a shockj (j = 1, 2, 3), where 1 is a 
fall in demand, 2 is an intermediate input price rise and 3 is a wage increase, is given by: 
 







with ߚ଴ ൌ0  and ܺ௜ is a set of explanatory variables describing firm i. 
 
Using the pooled dataset of survey results for 15 European countries, we estimate this model by maximum likelihood. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimation results, we also estimate the marginal effect associated to 
each explanatory variable for each outcome k.9. 
 
A similar procedure is used in order to model how firms change costs ("Choice 2" variable), using a slightly different 
set of explanatory variables. In that case, a firm faces 5 options (1. Change fixed or variable wage, 2. Change 
permanent employment, 3. Change temporary employment, 4. Change hours worked, 5. Change other costs). 
 
Compared to the methodology followed in Bertola et al. (2010), our estimation procedure models the probability of 
the different strategies in one single model. We have also decided to pool the responses to the two cost-push shocks 
in one single equation, instead of estimating one equation for each shock. By so doing, we increase the number of 
available observations, which allows us to perform our estimation with a sufficient number of degrees of freedom.10 
                                                                 
9   Note that the marginal effects of dummy variables are estimated as the change in the probability associated to a change in the 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. When several dummy variables are related (country dummies, sectoral dummies or size dummies) 
the marginal effect reflects the change in probability associated to a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1, keeping all 
related dummy variables to 0. Because the standard error associated to marginal effects of a multinomial Logit model are not 
trivially estimated, they have been evaluated by bootstrap, based on 1000 replications. 
10  The estimation of multinomial Logit requires a large number of observations because the number of estimated parameters 
increases rapidly with the number of options available. 13
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Moreover, the pooling of the two shocks simplifies the presentation of the results. As information on responses to 
wage shocks was not available for Ireland, the pooled sample only considers 14 countries. We also exploited the 
response to demand shocks, but these results are only presented in Appendix 5 and we only comment them when 
they are significantly different from the response to cost-push shocks.11 
3.  RESPONSE TO UNEXPECTED ADVERSE SHOCKS: DO BELGIAN FIRMS BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY? 
3.1.  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The results of the WDN firm-level survey on wage-setting reveal that, in response to an unexpected adverse shock 
(either a demand fall, intermediate input price rise or wage increase), firms mainly react by adjusting both prices and 
costs. Adapting production or margins is, on average, never indicated as the most relevant strategy, except for the 
latter in the case of a wage shock affecting euro area countries. An overview of the response to the three shocks is 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Firms that respond to a shock by adjusting their costs were also asked what strategy they pursued. Taking all three 
shocks together12, results (presented in Figure 1) show that, on average in the 15 countries participating to the 
survey, 45% of firms reduced their cost by cutting non-labor costs. Adjusting employment is the strategy used by 33% 
of firms. Consistent with the downward wage rigidity found in the survey results (Babecký et al., 2009a), very few 
firms respond by cutting base wages, while in 11% of cases variable pay components are reduced. The strategy of 
reducing working time is pursued by 8% of firms.  
 
While Belgian firms also mainly react by adjusting prices and/or costs in reaction to a demand or cost-push shock, the 
cost reduction is pursued by almost 50% of firms through cutting employment. Reducing non-labor costs is only the 
second option and is applied by 39% of firms. 
 
Table 4 - Reaction to shocks 












Belgium           
Demand shock  70  92  78  73  95 
Intermediate input price shock  80  80  71  48  94 
Wage shock  87  83  73  45  94 
Average of 15 countries
1           
Demand shock  81  94  84  72  94 
Intermediate input price shock  87  89  84  56  96 
Wage shock  86  83  83  57  94 
Average of euro area countries
2           
Demand shock  80  95  84  71  93 
Intermediate input price shock  86  89  86  55  95 
Wage shock  85  82  85  58  92 
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled excluding missing answers. 
1 AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI. 
2 AT, BE, ES, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI. 
 
   
                                                                 
11  This procedure allows estimating the different options of a firm in one single step but it also has some drawbacks. Firstly, when 
analyzing the cost-reduction strategies, the potential selection between Choice 1 and Choice 2 (Choice 2 is only observed for 
Choice 1 = 2 or 3) is not taken into account. Secondly, any firm specific effect (nor random or fixed) is considered. Firm specific 
fixed effects would require the estimation of too many parameters, while the introduction of random effects would be 
technically complicated and is not handled by standard econometric software. 
12  Similar results are found for each shock separately, although, in the case of an intermediate input price shock, the reduction of 
non-labor costs is more important, while employment is adapted to a lesser extent than on average. The inverse holds for a 
demand shock, while the reaction to a wage shock stands midway. 14
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Figure 1 - Cost-cutting strategies 
(average response to three shocks, percentages of total) 
 
 
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled excluding missing answers. 
1 AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI. 
2 AT, BE, ES, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI. 
 
In what follows, the individual responses of firms' to the two cost-push shocks, on the one hand, and to the demand 
shock, on the other hand, are confronted to the set of explanatory variables described in Section 2. The results are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 (cost-push shocks) and in Appendix 5 (demand shock) and they are expressed in terms of 
marginal effects at the sample mean. They have to be interpreted as follows: the first figure in column (2) of Table 5 
means that an increase of 1 percentage point of low skilled blue collar workers in the labor force increases the 
probability of adjusting prices by 2;2% (significant at 5%). The fourth figure in column (2) of Table 5 indicates that 
firms using a rule that links base wage changes to inflation are 0.8% less likely to adjust prices in response to a cost-
push shock (but this effect is not significant). 
 
3.2.  PRICES AND COSTS: WHAT AFFECTS THE ADJUSTMENT CHANNEL AT THE FIRM LEVEL? 
  As mentioned in Section 3.1, firms that face an unexpected adverse shock, whatsoever its nature (cost-push or 
demand shock), mainly react by adjusting prices or costs. In the case of a cost-push shock (increase in price of 
intermediate inputs or wages), 14% of firms will only adjust prices, 11% of them will only reduce costs and 65% will 
adjust both prices and costs, while the remaining 10% will use another strategy (mainly a reduction of output or 
margins)(see Table 5). Hence, the most popular response is a combination of price and cost adjustment. Confirming 
earlier findings from the Inflation Persistence Network (Fabiani et al., 2007), asymmetric reactions between types of 
shocks are found: firms are more inclined to increase prices after a cost-push shock than to cut prices in response to 
weaker demand.13 
 
The choice between prices and costs or a combination of both depends on the environment the firm operates in. 
 
In theory, firms facing strong competition, have very few margins to adapt prices and are thus expected to reduce 
costs in response to shocks. Results do not confirm this theory, as firms acting in a competitive environment seem to 
be less likely to reduce costs. However, they are significantly more likely to use a combination of both price and cost 
adjustment. An environment where a larger share of prices are state-dependent, used as a proxy for price flexibility, 
does not enhance a price response and reduces the probability of a reaction in costs and prices. The inconclusiveness 
of the latter results could be due to the choice of the price flexibility measure. 
 
When the labor cost share is high, prices are more likely to be adapted. A tight link between wage and price changes 
when labor costs are an important part of total costs has also been found in Druant et al. (2009). Looking closer at 
wage rigidities, results show that the existence of a collective wage agreement signed outside the firm increases the 
odds of a price and a cost/price reaction. This would mean that rigidities in wages increase the likelihood that cost 
shocks will be passed on to prices and, hence, be a sign of the presence of second round effects. However, this 
                                                                 
13  The results for the demand shock can be found in Appendix 5.1. 
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evidence is not confirmed by other measures of wage rigidity tested, namely downward nominal wage rigidity or the 
existence of a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation. The presence of a firm-level wage agreement 
does not have any significant effects on the choice between adjustment strategies. Firms employing many blue collar 
workers seem to adapt more easily prices. Those firms probably have smaller margins to reduce costs when facing 
shocks than firms characterized by a large share of white collar employment. After controlling for the factors 
mentioned above, the same conclusion holds for small firms. Looking at country effects, controlling for the impact of 
all other explanatory variables and taking Belgium as the reference country, firms in most countries seem to be less 
inclined to adjust only costs or only prices and more inclined to use a mixture of both adjustments. However, the 
position of Belgian firms is not particular in this respect.14 
 
Considering the goodness of fit of our model, the pseudo R² associated to the estimation of our baseline multinomial 
Logit specification is relatively small. Moreover, it seems that most of the explanatory power of the model is 
associated to the dummy variables coding for the firm size, the sector and the country.15 
 
In an alternative specification, the set of explanatory variables has been extended. We considered the percentage of 
employees covered by a collective agreement (hereafter named "coverage") and the share of the wage bill related to 
individual or company performance as additional explanatory variables. Results with respect to the flexible wage bill 
are not significant. Firms in which a large share of workers is covered by a collective wage agreement are more 
inclined to reduce prices and costs in response to shocks. This confirms the assumption that rigidities in wages might 
increase the likelihood of transmitting cost shocks into prices. 
   
                                                                 
14   Several robustness checks of our results have been performed (introduction of shock specific dummies, removal of not 
significant variables ...). These alternative specifications did not alter the main results discussed in Section 3.2. 
15  The size, sector and country indicator variables account for 90% of the pseudo R² of our baseline model. 16
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Table 5 - Adjustment in response to cost-push shocks: pooled regression 
(in % , unweighted data) 
  Marginal effects at the sample mean on: 






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Prices  Costs  Prices and 
costs   
Low skilled blue collar  2.2  -3.0  6.3  -5.6 
High skilled blue collar  4.2  -1.6  0.7  -3.4 
Low skilled white collar  0.6  0.3  1.5  -2.4 
Policy that adapts changes in base wages 
to inflation  -0.8  -0.9  3.6  -1.9 
Share of permanent part time 
employment  -1.4  -0.3  0.9  0.7 
Share of temporary employment  -2.4  1.6  -1.4  2.2 
Importance of labor costs in total costs  3.4  -1.2  -2.8  0.6 
Very likely or likely to follow a competitor's 
price cut  -0.6  -1.5  6.1  -4.1 
Collective agreement at the firm level  -0.3  0.4  0.5  -0.6 
Collective agreement signed outside the 
firm   2.3  -0.1  2.4  -4.6 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has 
base wage been frozen over the last 5 
years? 
-1.2  0.8  1.6  -1.2 
Price flexibility: price changes are not 
concentrated in particular month(s)  -0.3  0.4  -1.7  1.6 
5-19 employees  4.2  -4.9  0.2  0.5 
20-49 employees  2.0  -3.9  3.0  -1.1 
50-199 employees  1.9  -3.6  2.4  -0.7 
Construction  6.4  -1.6  -5.8  1.0 
Trade  0.6  1.9  -3.5  1.0 
Market services  2.1  1.5  -6.5  2.9 
Financial intermediation  -0.2  5.9  -20.8  15.2 
AT  -3.8  -1.2  9.1  -4.1 
CZ  -4.3  0.2  11.7  -7.7 
EE  -2.6  -3.8  17.3  -10.9 
ES  -0.6  -2.0  2.2  0.3 
FR  14.4  -4.5  -14.7  4.8 
GR  0.7  15.5  -17.0  0.8 
HU  -2.2  18.0  -16.9  1.1 
IT  -10.5  -0.2  16.6  -5.9 
LT  -4.5  -4.8  17.5  -8.2 
NL  -1.9  -3.0  9.4  -4.5 
PL  -3.4  -5.6  16.6  -7.5 
PT  -8.7  -2.4  14.3  -3.2 
SI  -9.6  -1.6  6.8  4.4 
Observations  22,129  22,129  22,129  22,129 
Freq. distr. (%)  13.6  11.4  64.7  10.3 
Pseudo R
2  0.0743 
     
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
3  0.0671 
     
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italic are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
IE: did not include the wage shock in the questionnaire. 
BE: reference country. Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
1 Increasing prices  and/or reducing costs.  
2 Mainly a reduction of margins or output. 
3 The Pseudo R² of the restricted model is the pseudo R² associated to a model that only includes size, sector and country dummies. 
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3.3.  HOW DO FIRMS ADJUST COST? 
  As outlined in Section 2.2, the relevance of employment adjustment as a cost-cutting strategy is to a large extent 
determined by the presence of wage and employment rigidities, competitive pressures and by labor intensity. These 
factors will not necessarily lead to similar reductions in permanent employment (pursued by 9% of firms, see Table 6) 
and in the easy-to-adjust level of temporary employees (pursued by 17% of firms). 
 
Wage rigidities, measured by the existence of collective wage agreements signed outside the firm, enhance a 
reduction of temporary employment in response to adverse shocks. This is also the case for another measure of 
downward real wage rigidity, namely the presence of a wage-setting rule that links base wage variations to (past or 
expected) inflation when a demand shock occurs. However, the existence of a firm-level wage agreement does not 
have any significant impact. Our results also seem to indicate that firms facing downward nominal wage rigidity are 
more likely to reduce flexible wages. The contra-intuitiveness of the latter result could be due to the choice of the 
measure for downward nominal wage rigidity. However, it  is consistent with the finding of Babecký et al. (2009b) that 
firms subject to nominal wage rigidity are more likely to use alternative ways of cutting labor costs, such as recruiting 
new workers at lower wages, using early retirement to replace workers on high wages with workers on lower wages, 
reducing or abolishing bonuses or benefits in kind, adjusting shift working, and delaying or freezing promotions. The 
result with respect to nominal rigidities suggests that it is the downward real rigidity that is the source of larger 
employment fluctuations. 
 
If we consider the finding of Messina et al. (2010) that wage rigidity is higher for high skilled workers, our estimation 
results with respect to skill levels do not support this argument: the larger the share of (low-skilled) blue collar, the 
lower the odds that a firm reduces wages in response to adverse shocks. This result could partly reflect that firms that 
employ many blue collars probably have fewer margins to adjust wages as only a small share of wages of blue collars 
is flexible. However, even after controlling for this in alternative specifications (not presented), this result still holds. 
The largest employment reaction (permanent and temporary employment) is found for low skilled blue collars, for 
which labor adjustment costs are generally smaller. Moreover, the larger the share of blue collar workers in the labor 
force, the larger the probability to cut hours worked.  
 
As expected, employment flexibility, measured by the share of part time and temporary employment, enhances the 
reaction of hours worked and reduces the probability of decreasing flexible pay. A high share of temporary 
employment increases the likelihood of a reaction in temporary employment, while it protects permanent 
employment from being reduced. This indicates that European firms tend to divide their labor force into a core 
component, which is relatively well protected from adverse shocks, and a peripheral component, which supports the 
necessary adjustment. 
 
As expected (Bertola et al., 2010), competitive pressures and a labor intensive production process increase the 
likelihood of permanent employment and flexible wage responses to shocks. 
 
After controlling for the factors mentioned above, smaller firms seem to prefer adjusting costs by reducing hours 
worked and non-labor costs, but they are less likely to cut temporary employment. This result holds when the share of 
flexible wage, which is higher in larger firms, is taken into account (alternative specification) and could reflect the fact 
that smaller firms have simply less margin to reduce the already limited amount of employment. Moreover, 
professional relationships are probably tighter in small firms, which can restrain employers from cutting employment 
and induce them to wait for better times. These results are of course conditional on the fact that the shock is not that 
large that it makes firms disappear, a factor we cannot control for on the basis of the survey information and that 
applies rather to the more cyclically sensitive small firms.  
 
Compared to manufacturing, construction and market services (as well as trade in the case of a demand shock) are 
more likely to reduce flexible pay (even after controlling for the share of flexible wages in total wages) and less likely 
to cut temporary employment.16 
 
Finally, according to alternative specifications (not presented here), a high share of variable pay increases the reaction 
through flexible wages and safeguards employment. Firms in which a large share of workers are covered by a 
                                                                 
16   Several robustness checks of our results have been performed (introduction of shock specific dummies, removal of not 
significant variables ...). These alternative specifications did not alter the main results discussed in Section 3.3. 18
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collective wage agreement are more inclined to reduce (permanent) employment, confirming the results found with 
respect to the existence of a collective wage agreement signed outside the firm. 
 
Table 6 - Cost adjustment after cost-push shocks: pooled regression 
(in %, unweighted data) 













employment  Hours worked 
Low skilled blue collar  -6.1  1.4  3.7  5.3  -4.3 
High skilled blue collar   -2.4  0.7  3.6  4.5  -6.4 
Low skilled white collar    -0.5  0.4  -0.2  -1.0  1.3 
Policy that adapts changes in base wages to 
inflation    0.4  -0.8  0.2  -0.2  0.4 
Share of permanent part time employment    -4.3  2.4  -1.2  3.2  -0.1 
Share of temporary employment    -2.6  -6.6  14.3  2.2  -7.2 
Importance of labor costs in total costs    7.0  6.8  0.2  1.1  -15.1 
Very likely or likely to follow a competitor's 
price cut    1.5  1.3  0.9  -0.2  -3.6 
Collective agreement at the firm level    -0.5  1.0  -0.3  0.5  -0.6 
Collective agreement signed outside the firm     -1.5  0.2  2.7  -0.5  -0.9 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years?    2.6  0.7  0.9  -1.0  -3.2 
5-19 employees    -0.9  1.0  -7.6  2.5  5.0 
20-49 employees    -0.8  0.2  -6.4  2.0  5.0 
50-199 employees    1.5  -0.5  -4.1  1.6  1.6 
Construction    2.9  -1.1  -2.4  -1.1  1.7 
Trade    1.0  1.9  -4.0  0.7  0.4 
Market services    2.2  0.7  -3.2  0.9  -0.7 
Financial intermediation    -0.7  2.3  0.6  -1.9  -0.3 
AT    2.8  -10.3  -16.6  12.9  11.2 
CZ    4.6  -4.6  -3.8  -7.0  10.8 
EE    7.6  -5.9  -1.4  -6.2  5.9 
ES    9.8  -11.0  3.2  -4.4  2.3 
FR    3.1  -11.0  3.8  -0.4  4.5 
GR    22.6  5.9  -8.3  26.4  -46.6 
HU    6.7  -11.8  -14.2  -6.5  25.7 
IT    4.6  -7.0  -0.9  2.9  0.4 
LT    3.9  -8.8  -6.3  -6.1  17.2 
NL    -1.2  -16.0  12.4  -5.7  10.5 
PL    7.2  -0.6  -11.5  -4.6  9.5 
PT    22.4  -8.2  -8.6  -3.5  -2.2 
SI    7.2  -11.3  -8.6  -3.9  16.6 
Observations   14.404  14.404  14.404  14.404  14.404 
Freq. distr. (%)    11.1   9.2  17.3  6.3  56.0 
Pseudo R
2   0.0771 
       
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
1   0.0678 
       
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italic are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
IE: did not include the wage shock in the questionnaire. 
BE: reference country. Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
1 The Pseudo R² of the restricted model is the pseudo R² associated to a model that only includes size, sector and country dummies.  
 
To summarize our main results, we find that an employment reaction in response to a shock is more likely in firms 
facing real wage rigidities linked to the existence of wage-setting institutions, such as collective wage agreements 
signed outside the firm, policies that adapt changes in wages to indexation, and a high coverage, as well as in firms 
active in a high competitive and labor intensive environment. Besides, a high share of temporary employees increases 19
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the likelihood of a reduction of temporary employment, while it protects permanent employment. Employment is also 
s a f e g u a r d e d  b y  a  l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  f l e x i b l e  p a y  i n  t o t a l  w a g e s .
Bertola et al. (2010), although their results are not based on the 
wages to indexation and coverage were not tested
employing a large share of low skilled blue collars, 
market services are less likely to cut temporary employment.
 
If some explanatory variables significantly affect the probability associated to the different cost reduction strategies, 
the explanatory power of those variables is 
and most of the explanation comes from the size, sector and country dummies (
 
Most of these findings can partly explain the stronger employment reaction of 
of countries participating in the survey. Belgian companies are indeed characterized (see Table 2) by a larger share of 
above firm-level collective wage agreements, an automatic system of index
share of employees covered by collective agreements, a low share of flexible wages, many low skilled blue collars in 
their workforce and a slightly higher labor intensity, compared to the average of the 15 countries participating to the 
survey. The low competitive pressure they face and the presence of many small firms, however, should safeguard 
employment. As to the first variable, it is probably unreliable because of the very low response rate in Belgium. In 
Section 4, we will use an alternative measure for competition. The relatively small share of temporary employment in 
Belgium, will, on the one hand, reduce lay
permanent employees when shocks occur.
 
After controlling for the impact of all variables mentioned above, the different employment response of Belgian firms 
to shocks compared to other countries remains significant. Firms in almost all countries are significantly less likely to 
reduce permanent and temporary empl
competition etc. (see Table 6). They are also less likely to reduce labor time, while the odds of cutting non
or flexible wages are higher.  
 
temporary employment, while it protects permanent employment. Employment is also 
s a f e g u a r d e d  b y  a  l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  f l e x i b l e  p a y  i n  t o t a l  w a g e s .   These results corroborate earlier findings by 
their results are not based on the same set of variables (policies that adapt changes in 
were not tested). Moreover, we find a larger employment reaction 
low skilled blue collars, while small firms and firms operating in 
market services are less likely to cut temporary employment. 
If some explanatory variables significantly affect the probability associated to the different cost reduction strategies, 
the explanatory power of those variables is still extremely small (pseudo R² of 0.077 for the pooled cost
and most of the explanation comes from the size, sector and country dummies (88% of the explanation).
Most of these findings can partly explain the stronger employment reaction of Belgian firms compared to the average 
of countries participating in the survey. Belgian companies are indeed characterized (see Table 2) by a larger share of 
level collective wage agreements, an automatic system of index-linking wages to past in
share of employees covered by collective agreements, a low share of flexible wages, many low skilled blue collars in 
their workforce and a slightly higher labor intensity, compared to the average of the 15 countries participating to the 
vey. The low competitive pressure they face and the presence of many small firms, however, should safeguard 
employment. As to the first variable, it is probably unreliable because of the very low response rate in Belgium. In 
native measure for competition. The relatively small share of temporary employment in 
Belgium, will, on the one hand, reduce lay-offs of temporary workers, but, on the other hand, it won't protect 
permanent employees when shocks occur. 
or the impact of all variables mentioned above, the different employment response of Belgian firms 
to shocks compared to other countries remains significant. Firms in almost all countries are significantly less likely to 
reduce permanent and temporary employment than Belgian firms with the same characteristics in terms of coverage, 
competition etc. (see Table 6). They are also less likely to reduce labor time, while the odds of cutting non
 
temporary employment, while it protects permanent employment. Employment is also 
These results corroborate earlier findings by 
policies that adapt changes in 
a larger employment reaction for firms 
while small firms and firms operating in construction, trade and 
If some explanatory variables significantly affect the probability associated to the different cost reduction strategies, 
077 for the pooled cost-push shocks) 
% of the explanation). 
Belgian firms compared to the average 
of countries participating in the survey. Belgian companies are indeed characterized (see Table 2) by a larger share of 
linking wages to past inflation, a high 
share of employees covered by collective agreements, a low share of flexible wages, many low skilled blue collars in 
their workforce and a slightly higher labor intensity, compared to the average of the 15 countries participating to the 
vey. The low competitive pressure they face and the presence of many small firms, however, should safeguard 
employment. As to the first variable, it is probably unreliable because of the very low response rate in Belgium. In 
native measure for competition. The relatively small share of temporary employment in 
offs of temporary workers, but, on the other hand, it won't protect 
or the impact of all variables mentioned above, the different employment response of Belgian firms 
to shocks compared to other countries remains significant. Firms in almost all countries are significantly less likely to 
oyment than Belgian firms with the same characteristics in terms of coverage, 
competition etc. (see Table 6). They are also less likely to reduce labor time, while the odds of cutting non-labor costs 
 
Figure 2 - Cost adjustment after cost-push 
(rank of countries; the higher the rank, the more intensively the strategy is used)
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
IE: excluded, because it did not include the wage shock in 
push shocks: pooled regression  
of countries; the higher the rank, the more intensively the strategy is used) 
 
IE: excluded, because it did not include the wage shock in the questionnaire. 
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Based on the probabilities computed at the sample mean, the ranking of the 15 countries reveals that Belgium is 
ranked highest, after Greece, with respect to the probability of permanent employment adjustment. It is lowest in the 
Netherlands, a country where firms mostly respond to adverse shocks by cutting temporary employment. A similar 
trade-off between low permanent employment reaction and high temporary employment adjustment is also found in 
Spain and France. It goes in the opposite direction in Greece and Poland. Both types of employment reaction rank high 
in Belgium, as well as in Italy Estonia and the Czech Republic. 
 
In order to explain the remaining cross-country differentials, we regress the probability to adjust wages, permanent 
employment or temporary employment on a set of the 5 variables observed at the national level mentioned in 
Section 2. Three of those variables relate to the strictness of employment protection legislation, namely protection 
against dismissals, temporary employment regulation and regulation on collective dismissals. The other two country-
specific variables tested are the implicit tax rate on labor and the net replacement ratio of unemployment benefits. 
The complete set of results is presented in Appendix 4.1 (cost-push shocks) and Appendix 4.2 (demand shock). The 
most significant results are found when the strictness of protection against dismissals and of temporary employment 
regulations are taken into account, presented as equation 3 (OLS) and equation 4 (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, QML 
estimation) in Appendix 4.1 and 4.2. Based on these equations, it seems that the more stringent the protection 
against dismissals, the more firms adjust wages and the less firms adjust permanent employment in response to an 
adverse shock. The marginal effect of an increase in protection of 1 (its value ranges from 0 to 4, according to the 
increasing degree of stringency) is a 4.2% higher likeliness of a decrease of wages and a 2.1% lower probability of a 
reduction in permanent employment in the case of cost-push shocks (respectively 4.8% and -6.2% in the case of a 
demand shock). Results with respect to temporary employment, although not significant, point to a positive 
relationship with the strictness of employment protection. This means that this form of labor market regulation 
safeguards permanent employment, while temporary employment acts as a buffer against shocks. Similar results were 
found by Bertola et al. (2010). As employment protection legislation is less severe in Belgium compared to the average 
of 15 countries participating in the survey (see Table 3), this indicator helps to explain the larger reaction of 
permanent employment to shocks in Belgian firms. 
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4.  FIRM LEVEL RESPONSE TO UNEXPECTED ADVERSE SHOCKS: SPECIFICITIES OF THE BELGIAN SAMPLE  
In a second analysis, we focus on the Belgian sample of 1,420 firms and try to distinguish some common features of 
B e l g i a n  f i r m s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  w a y  t h e y  r e a c t  t o  u n e x p e c t e d  a d v e r s e  s h o c k s .  I t  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  s e t  o f  t h e 
explanatory variables used in Section 3, but some variables could no longer be used while others were added, based 
on information specific to the Belgian survey. Weighted averages of all these variables are presented in Table 7. 
 









Turnover: share of employees that joined the firm - share of employees 
that left the firm  -0.1  + 
Downward real wage rigidity based on distribution of individual wage 
changes   0.6  + 
Positive wage cushion: actual wages > pay scales  72.7  - 
No use of alternative strategies (other than cut/freeze base wages) to 
reduce labor costs  67.4  + 
Profit elasticity   7.8  + 
Firm's employees are covered by an all-in clause  36.2  - 
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled excluding missing answers. 
 
As almost 100% of Belgian firms are covered by a sector-level wage agreement and adopt an automatic system of 
index-linking wages to past inflation, the variables "collective agreement signed outside the firm" and "policy that 
adapts changes in base wage to inflation" could not be used. The latter was replaced by an indicator, which represents 
the share of employees not hit by a real wage cut, while this would have been the case in the absence of rigidities 
(calculated by Du Caju et al., 2009 for 15 branches of activity).  
 
Besides, the effect on wage developments of the Belgian system of automatic wage indexation is tempered to some 
extent by the activation of all-in clauses which are included in some sectoral wage agreements17.  B a s e d o n 
information from the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, 36 % of employees covered by 
the survey are subject to this type of clause. Under such sectoral wage agreements, the agreed wage increases 
depends on the difference between actual and forecasted indexation. If the actual indexation exceeds the level of 
indexation forecasted at the time of the sectoral negotiations, the difference is deducted from the real wage increases 
and, in some cases, even from the nominal wage increases. As such, the existence of all-in clauses reduces wage 
rigidity. 
 
The set of variables used for the Belgian analysis also includes additional information. First, we consider a variable that 
captures wage adjustment margins by the existence of a positive wage cushion. Namely, we observe in the Belgian 
survey the extent to which the wages actually paid deviate from the scales fixed by the agreements at the sector level. 
Only very few firms answer that they pay lower wages, while the wages of 73 % of employees covered by the survey 
are higher than pay scales. Such a positive wage cushion can provide a buffer between the actual wage and the lower 
limit for that wage, so that the firm has more scope for adjusting the actual wage in line with economic circumstances 
without coming up against the lower limit. As such, a positive wage cushion leads to higher wage flexibility.  
 
Another variable, although only indirectly related to wage rigidity, is computed on the basis of the survey question 
"Apart from reducing or freezing base wages, has your firm used other strategies to reduce labor costs?" Among the 
possibilities were mentioned: recruiting new workers at lower wages, using early retirement to replace workers on 
high wages with workers on lower wages, reducing or abolishing bonuses or benefits in kind, adjusting shift working, 
and delaying or freezing promotions. If none of these alternative strategies other than base wages cuts or freezes to 
                                                                 
17  More details on the Belgian automatic indexation system and on the all-in clauses can be found in "Report 2008, Economic and 
financial developments" of the National Bank of Belgium, Section 4.2. 22
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reduce labor costs are used, the only adjustment margin left is to cut employment, as in the case of wage rigidity. This 
is the case for 67 % of employees covered by the survey. 
 
Finally, we added a measure of employment turnover, calculated as the share of employees that joined the firm 
during the reference period of the survey minus the share of employees that left the firm. This variable captures 
whether a firm is in a phase of expansion or decline and gives indications on the flexibility of employment. 
 
As the response rate to the question used to proxy competitive pressure in the international analysis was relatively 
low in Belgium (less than 40%18), the profit elasticity estimated by Du Caju et al. (2009) for 15 branches of activity has 
been used as an alternative in the Belgian analysis; following the arguments in Boone (2008). 
 
As to the choice between adjusting prices, costs, or prices and costs in reaction to a shock, Belgian firms behave more 
or less as the average of 15,000 European firms, with some more emphasis on pure price reductions: 18% of Belgian 
firms will only adjust prices, 11% will only cut costs, 61% will adjust both prices and costs, while the remaining 10% will 
follow another strategy (see Table 8) 
 
If the explanatory power of our model of the choice between adjusting prices and / or costs in the case of cost-push 
shocks is rather weak, a firm level analysis still reveals that a pure price adjustment strategy is more likely, and, hence, 
a pure cost reduction is in most cases less likely, in firms employing many low skilled blue collars, in small companies 
and in the construction sector19 and in the presence of downward real wage rigidities (only for a demand shock). The 
impact of price flexibility is counterintuitive and neither corroborates the results of the international analysis in 
Section 3.2. The shortcomings with respect to the price flexibility measure used were already emphasized in that 
section. The impact of the labor cost share is negligible. 
 
On the contrary, firms are less inclined to adopt a pure price adjustment strategy, and more to reduce costs, if they 
face high competition, if they belong to the financial intermediation sector and if there are signs of wage flexibility, 
namely if there exists a firm-level wage agreement or an all-in clause limiting the effect of the automatic wage 
indexation mechanism (only in the case of a demand shock). The existence of a wage cushion, which could be another 
sign that wage flexibility decreases the likelihood that (cost) shocks will be passed on to prices, however, does not 
confirm this evidence. 
 
   
                                                                 
18  This is due to the fact that the information comes from a survey conducted for the same sample of firms in the context of the 
Inflation Persistence Network. To reduce the burden for participating firms, the question was not asked again in the WDN-
survey, reducing the response to firms answering both questionnaires.  
19  Sector and sizes dummies are the variables which contribute the most to the pseudo R² of our model (68%) 23
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Table 8 - Adjustment of Belgian firms in response to cost-push shocks: pooled regression  
(in %, unweighted data) 
  Marginal effects at the sample mean on: 
   Probability of adjusting
1:  Probability of 
other 
adjustment
2     Prices  Costs  Prices and 
costs 
Low skilled blue collar  9.1  -7.9  -0.3  -0.9 
High skilled blue collar  2.5  -2.6  -3.9  3.9 
Low skilled white collar  6.9  -3.9  -10.1  7.0 
Share of permanent part time employment  -10.6  0.8  -0.2  10.0 
Share of temporary employment  -0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0 
Importance of labor costs in total costs  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.1 
Collective agreement at the firm level  -3.8  0.2  2.3  1.3 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years? 
-1.3  3.4  -3.5  1.3 
Price flexibility: price changes are not 
concentrated in particular month(s) 
-1.4  3.5  -5.7  3.6 
Share of employees that joined the firm - 
share of employees that left the firm 
0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
Positive wage cushion: actual wages > pay 
scales 
1.6  -2.2  6.0  -5.3 
Downward real wage rigidity based on 
distribution of individual wage changes 
3.8  5.7  -15.3  5.8 
Profit elasticity   -3.6  2.2  0.9  0.6 
Firm's employees are covered by an all-in 
clause 
-3.2  0.9  0.8  1.4 
5-19 employees  10.5  0.5  -11.3  0.3 
20-49 employees  10.0  -1.2  -5.6  -3.2 
50-199 employees  2.5  3.6  -4.0  -2.1 
Construction  12.0  -8.4  -5.2  1.6 
Trade  1.0  0.8  -4.7  2.8 
Market services  -5.7  3.9  -3.0  4.8 
Financial intermediation  -11.1  47.4  -35.9  -0.5 
Observations  2,023  2,023  2,023  2,023 
Freq. distr. (%)  17.7  10.6  61.5  10.1 
Pseudo R
2  0.0685 
     
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
3  0.0468 
     
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italic are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group.
 
1 Increasing prices and/or reducing costs.  
2 Mainly a reduction of margins or output. 
3 The Pseudo R² of the restricted model is the pseudo R² associated to a model that only includes size and sector dummies.  
 
The cost-adjustment strategy of Belgian firms differs significantly from the average of firms in the 15 participating 
countries: 18% of firms will reduce the permanent workforce and 19% will cut temporary employment (see Table 9), 
compared to respectively 9% and 17% on average for the two cost-push shocks (see Table 6) and 28% and 23%, 
compared to 13% and 25% for the demand shock (see Appendix 5.4 and 5.2).. The strong reaction of temporary 
employment is remarkable as this type of employees is only 2.7% of the workforce in Belgium, while it is 10% on 
average in all countries considered (see Table 2). However, the adjustment costs associated to temporary 
employment relative to the adjustment costs associated to permanent employment seem to be extremely low in 
Belgium (Dhyne and Mahy, 2009). Even if temporary employment represents a small fraction of total employment, 
almost 20% of Belgian firms, mostly the large ones, have temporary employees in their workforce. Therefore, many 
firms can use flexible employment as a buffer to absorb unexpected shocks. 
 
Wage rigidity/flexibility has a strong impact on the cost-adjustment strategy used by firms to face shocks. The 
likelihood of a reduction of temporary employment is higher in the presence of downward real wage rigidity, and it is 
lower when a wage cushion exists. The variable with respect to the inclusion of all-in clauses in collective wage 24
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a g r e e m e n t s  d o e s  n o t  s h o w  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  a p a r t  f r o m  r e d u c i n g  o r  f r e e z i n g  b a s e  w a g e s ,  n o 
alternative strategies to reduce labor costs are used does not generate a negative impact on employment. On the 
contrary, these firms seem to be, on average, less inclined to reduce permanent or temporary employment, their 
preferred adjustment strategy being a reduction of non-labor costs. 
 
Table 9 - Cost adjustment in Belgium after cost-push shocks: pooled regression  
(in %, unweighted data)   
  Marginal effects at the sample mean on: 
   Probability of 
reducing 
(flexible) wage 
Probability of reducing employment  Probability of 
reducing non-
labor costs     Permanent 
employment 
Temporary 
employment  Hours worked 
Low skilled blue collar  -6.9  1.1  24.9  3.9  -23.1 
High skilled blue collar  -4.3  -3.0  25.3  3.6  -21.5 
Low skilled white collar  2.0  4.6  13.1  2.7  -22.5 
Share of permanent part time employment  4.9  5.5  -3.9  4.1  -10.6 
Share of temporary employment  0.0  0.0  0.6  -0.2  -0.3 
Importance of labor costs in total costs  0.0  0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.2 
Collective agreement at the firm level  -0.4  3.9  -1.0  -0.6  -1.9 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years?  1.9  1.0  -1.6  -0.6  -0.7 
Share of employees that joined the firm - share 
of employees that left the firm  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1 
Positive wage cushion: actual wages > pay 
scales  -3.4  3.4  -5.9  -0.1  6.0 
Downward real wage rigidity based on 
distribution of individual wage changes  -4.7  -2.0  30.8  0.8  -24.8 
Profit elasticity   -2.8  -0.6  -3.4  1.2  5.6 
No use of alternative strategies (other than 
cut/freeze base wages) to reduce labour costs  -3.1  -6.6  -6.9  -0.6  17.2 
Firm's employees are covered by an all-in 
clause  -1.5  -4.1  1.3  0.7  3.5 
5-19 employees  -4.0  -8.7  -6.8  2.7  16.8 
20-49 employees  -1.8  -8.8  -0.8  0.8  10.6 
50-199 employees  -2.0  -12.8  -1.9  0.3  16.3 
Construction  2.1  7.8  -15.7  -5.4  11.2 
Trade  7.0  7.3  -8.0  -3.6  -2.7 
Market services  -3.8  -2.6  -14.5  5.1  15.8 
Financial intermediation  -4.2  -10.1  6.0  -6.1  14.4 
Observations  1,211  1,211  1,211  1,211  1,211 
Freq. distr. (%)  5.2  18.2  19.1  6.4  51.1 
Pseudo R
2  0.0798 
       
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
1  0.0320 
       
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italic are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
1 The Pseudo R² of the restricted model is the pseudo R² associated to a model that only includes size and sector dummies.  
 
A larger employment reaction is found for firms employing a large share of blue collar workers (reduction of 
temporary employment) or temporary workers and, using a labor intensive production process (reduction of 
permanent employment is significant in the case of a demand shock). A lower employment reaction is found for 
smaller firms (compared to larger firms) and for firms operating in construction, trade and market services (compared 
to manufacturing and only for temporary employment). 
 
It is worth mentioning that, for this model, the contribution of the size and sector dummies to the explanation is much 
weaker, as they contribute only to 40% of the pseudo R² for the cost-push shocks. 
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The group of firms that are more likely to reduce hours worked in response to cost-push shocks, is characterized by a 
large share of part time employees, high profit elasticity, a small size in terms of number of employees and many blue 
collar workers. The system of temporary unemployment, which enables firms to reduce paid hours without having to 
fire people, was until July 2009 only applicable to the latter group of workers. Although the survey does not provide 
information on the time dimension of the reaction to shocks, results suggest that the system of temporary 
unemployment allows firms to encounter (short) bad periods, but that it does not protect against dismissal in the long 
run. A reduction of hours can also be realized through cutting overtime work and is more likely for blue and low-skilled 
white collars.20 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Besides confirming earlier findings with respect to the response of firms to cost-push shocks (Bertola et al., 2010) and 
to the link between wage and price changes (Druant et al., 2009), this paper provides new empirical evidence for 
monetary policy models, namely that real wage rigidities lead to larger employment reactions and that they are, just 
like employment protection, a cause of different employment response between countries. It analyses the reaction of 
Belgian firms to adverse shocks and compares with other European firms on the basis of the pooled results of a 
harmonized survey in 15 European countries, covering almost 15,000 firms. The Belgian dataset, which is part of the 
pooled database, comprises 1,420 firms.  
 
On the basis of the analysis of a pooled regression of the firms' reaction to two cost-push shocks, namely an increase 
in the cost of intermediate inputs and a general rise in labor costs, and of a regression of the firms' reaction to a 
negative demand shock, we test the adjustment channel used by European firms : Do they adjust prices ? Costs? Or a 
m ixture of both? In the case of a cos t adjus tme nt, the choice be twe e n a re duction of (base or fle xible ) w ages , 
permanent employment, temporary employment, hours worked or non-labor costs is investigated.  
 
This exercise is done twice: firstly, for a sample of 15,000 European firms, in order to detect whether Belgian firms 
exhibit different reactions, and secondly, for the sub-sample of Belgian firms only, in order to distinguish some 
c o m m o n  f e a t u r e s  o r  g r o u p s  o f  B e l g i a n  f i r m s ,  i n  t h e  w a y  t h e y  a d j u s t  t o  s h o c k s .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  t h e  s a m e  s e t  o f 
explanatory variables is used, although, in the latter case, additional variables, based on country-specific information, 
have been added. Although their explanatory power is limited, the variables investigated provide valuable information 
on the key question of this paper: why are Belgian firms using more intensively (relative to other European firms) the 
employment channel in response to adverse shocks? 
 
With respect to the choice between prices and costs, our analysis reveals that the most popular response to cost-push 
shocks, used by two-third of European firms, is a combination of both price and cost adjustment. 14% of firms will 
only adjust prices, 11% of them will only reduce costs, while the remaining 10% will use another strategy. A pure price 
adjustment strategy is more likely, and, hence, a pure cost reduction is in most cases less likely, if the labor cost share 
is high, in firms employing many (low skilled) blue collar workers, in small companies and when wages are rigid 
(although some measures of wage rigidity show counterintuitive results). On the contrary, firms are less inclined to 
adopt a pure price adjustment strategy, and more likely to reduce prices and costs, if they face high competition. 
Belgian firms behave more or less the same. Moreover, they add explanatory power to wage rigidity/flexibility, as the 
variable "firm-level wage agreement" becomes significant. Overall, international and Belgian survey findings with 
respect to wage rigidity suggest that flexible wages reduce the likelihood that (cost) shocks will be passed on to prices. 
 
Firms that respond to a shock by adjusting their costs, do so mostly by reducing non-labor costs. The survey analysis 
reveals that 27% of European firms will reduce employment, while the remaining 17% will cut flexible wages or 
working time. An employment reaction is more likely in firms facing (real) wage rigidities linked to the existence of 
wage-setting institutions, such as collective wage agreements signed outside the firm, policies that adapt changes in 
wages to indexation (only for a demand shock), and a high coverage, as well as in firms active in a highly competitive 
and labor intensive environment and employing many low skilled blue collars. Besides, a high share of temporary 
employees increases the likelihood of a reduction in temporary employment, while it protects permanent 
employment. This indicates that European firms divide their labor force into a core component, which is relatively well 
protected from adverse shocks, and a peripheral component, which supports the necessary adjustment. Employment 
                                                                 
20   Several robustness checks of our results have been performed (introduction of shock specific dummies, removal of not 
significant variables ...). These alternative specifications did not alter the main results discussed in Section 4. 26
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is also safeguarded by a large share of flexible pay in total wages and firms operating in construction, trade and 
market services, as well as small firms are less likely to cut back on temporary employment. The latter result could 
reflect the fact that smaller firms have simply less margin to reduce the already limited amount of employment and 
that tighter professional relationships might protect against dismissal. These results are of course conditional on the 
fact that the shock is not so large that it would push the firm out of the market, a factor we cannot control for. 
 
Most of these findings go some way towards explaining the stronger employment reaction of Belgian firms (37% of 
firms will cut employment) compared to the average of countries participating in the survey. Belgian companies are 
indeed characterized by a larger share of above-firm-level collective wage agreements, an automatic system of index-
linking wages to past inflation, a high share of employees covered by collective agreements, a low share of flexible 
wages, slightly higher labor intensity and many low skilled blue collars in their workforce, compared to the average of 
the 15 countries. As for the blue collar workers, a reduction in the number of hours worked is also more likely, 
because the system of temporary unemployment protects workers against dismissal in the initial phase of the shock. 
Even though the share of temporary employment is low in Belgium, its use is widespread and adjustment costs are 
low compared to permanent employment. Therefore, many firms use flexible employment as a buffer to absorb 
unexpected shocks. The presence of many small firms in Belgium also tends to safeguard employment. A test of some 
country-specific control variables reveals that employment is further protected by the presence of a wage cushion.  
 
After controlling for the impact of the common variables mentioned above, the difference between the employment 
response to shocks of firms in Belgium and that of other countries remains significant. In order to explain the 
remaining cross-country differences, the probability of adjusting wages, permanent employment or temporary 
employment is regressed on a set of variables observed at the national level. The results reveal that the more 
stringent the legislation with respect to the protection against dismissals, the more firms adjust wages and the less 
they tend to adjust permanent employment, with temporary employment contracts acting as a buffer in response to 
an adverse shock. As the legislation is less strict in Belgium, it helps to explain the larger reaction of permanent 
employment to shocks in Belgian firms. 
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Appendix 1 - Variables used in the international regression analysis 
Name  Description  Calculation  Availability by 
country 




Three shocks: wages 
or labor 
         
pays_1  AT 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 
0 otherwise 
Yes  Yes 
pays_2  BE  Yes  Yes 
pays_3  CZ  Yes  Yes 
pays_4  EE  Yes  Yes 
pays_5  ES  Yes  Yes 
pays_6  FR  Yes  Yes 
pays_7  GR  Yes  Yes 
pays_8  HU  Yes  Yes 
pays_9  IE  No  No 
pays_10  IT  Yes  Yes 
pays_11  LT  Yes  Yes 
pays_12  NL  Yes  Yes 
pays_13  PL  Yes  Yes 
pays_14  PT  Yes  Yes 
pays_15  SI  Yes  Yes 
         
sec_1  Manufacturing=NACE 15 to 
37 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 
0 otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
sec_2  Construction=NACE 45  All except ES, FR, GR, 
IE, IT 
All except ES, FR, GR, 
IE, IT 
sec_3  Trade=NACE 50 to 52  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
sec_4  Market services=NACE 55 to 
64 and 70 to 74 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
sec_5  Financial 
intermediation=NACE 65 to 
67 
All except CZ, EE, ES, 
FR, GR,IE 
All except CZ, EE, ES, 
FR, GR,IE 
         
size_1  5-19 employees 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 
0 otherwise 
All except CZ, IE  All except CZ, IE 
size_2  20-49 employees  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
size_3  50-199 employees  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
size_4  200 employees and more  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
Composition of the workforce 
     
    Dummies: 1 if yes, 
0 otherwise  
Drop if 
C_1a+C_1b+C_1c+
C_1d < than 90% of 
workforce 
   
C_1a  Low skilled blue collar  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
C_1b  High skilled blue collar  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
C_1c  Low skilled white collar  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
C_1d  High skilled white collar  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
C_34c  Share of permanent part 
time employment 
Pct. of total 
employment 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
C_34d  Share of temporary 
employment 
Pct. of total 
employment 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
Measure of price flexibility 
     
C_32m  Price changes are not 
concentrated in particular 
month(s) 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All  countries  except  IE  Not  used 
Direct measures of wage rigidity 
     
DNWR  Downward nominal wage 
rigidity: has base wage been 
frozen over the last 5 years? 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
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Variables added in the alternative international regression analysis 




       Three shocks: 
prices or costs 
Three shocks: wages 
or labor 
Indirect measures of wage rigidity 
     
coll_agr_firm  Collective  agreement  at  the 
firm level 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
coll_agr_out  Collective  agreement  signed 
outside the firm  
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
C_6  Policy that adapts changes 
in base wages to inflation 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
Intensity of product market competition 
     
compet  Very likely or likely to follow 
a competitor's price cut 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise 
All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
         
Labor intensity 
     
Lcost  Importance of labor costs in 
total costs 
Pct. of total costs  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
Indirect measures of wage rigidity 
     
coverage  Employees covered by a 
collective agreement 
Pct. of total 
employment 
All except  IE, SI  All except  IE, SI 
         
C_5a  Share of wage bill related to 
individual or company 
performance 
Pct. of wage bill  All countries except IE  All countries except IE 
Source: WDN. 
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Appendix 2 - Variables used in the Belgian regression analysis 
 








            
sec_1  Manufacturing=NACE 15 to 37 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
Used  Used 
sec_2  Construction=NACE 45  Used  Used 
sec_3  Trade=NACE 50 to 52  Used  Used 
sec_4  Market services=NACE 55 to 64 and 70 to 74  Used  Used 
sec_5  Financial intermediation=NACE 65 to 67  Used  Used 
size_1  5-19 employees 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
Used  Used 
size_2  20-49 employees  Used  Used 
size_3  50-199 employees  Used  Used 
size_4  200 employees and more  Used  Used 
Composition of the workforce  
        
C_1a  Low skilled blue collar 
Dummies: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
Drop if C_1a+C_1b+C_1c+C_ 
1d < than 90% of workforce 
Used  Used 
C_1b  High skilled blue collar  Used  Used 
C_1c  Low skilled white collar  Used  Used 
C_1d  High skilled white collar  Used  Used 
C_34c  Share of permanent part time employment  Pct. of total employment  Used  Used 
C_34d  Share of temporary employment  Pct. of total employment  Used  Used 
Turnover  Share of employees that joined the firm - 
share of employees that left the firm 
Pct. of total employment  Used  Used 
Measure of price flexibility  
        
C_32m  Price changes are not concentrated in 
particular month(s) 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Used  Not used 
Direct measures of wage rigidity  
        
DNWR  Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years? 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Used  Used 
DRWR_distr  Downward  real  wage  rigidity  based  on 
distribution of individual wage changes (Du 
Caju, Fuss, Wintr, 2009) 
Share of employees not hit by 
a real wage cut 
Used  Used 
            
Indirect measures of wage rigidity  
        
coll_agr_firm  Collective  agreement  at  the  firm  level  Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Used  Used 
POS_WC  Positive wage cushion: actual wages > pay 
scales 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Used  Used 
NO_STRAT  No use of alternative strategies (other than 
cut/freeze base wages) to reduce labor costs 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Not used  Used 
all_in  Firm's employees are covered by an all-in 
clause 
Dummy: 1 if yes, 0 otherwise  Used  Used 
Intensity of product market competition  
        
PROFITELAS  Profit elasticity (Du Caju, Fuss, Wintr, 2009)  High elasticity=more 
competition 
Used  Used 
Labor intensity  
        
Lcost  Importance of labor costs in total costs  Pct. of total costs  Used  Used 
Sources: WDN, unless otherwise stated. 
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Appendix 3 - Country dummies 
 
Name   Description  Calculation  Availability by country 
dism_reg_empl
_all 




Value from 0 to 4, according to 
increasing degree of strictness 
All countries 
temp_empl_all  Overall  strictness  of 
temporary employment 
regulation (2003) 
Value from 0 to 4, according to 
increasing degree of strictness 
All countries 
col_dism_all  Overall strictness of  
regulation on collective 
dismissals (2003) 
Value from 0 to 4, according to 
increasing degree of strictness 
All countries 
ITR  Implicit tax rate on labour 
(2006) 
Pct. of labor costs  All countries 
NETRPR  Net replacement rate of a 
single person in the initial 
phase of unemployment 
(2006) 
Pct. of last wage  All except EE, LT, SI 
Sources: EC (2009), OECD (2004 and 2006), Tonin (2005). 
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Appendix 4.1 - Results of regressions of country dummies on changes in wages, permanent and 
temporary employment for cost-push shocks 
Change in wages  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   0.0749  0.0554  0.0471  0.4218  0.0418 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0351  0.0289  0.0287  0.2774  0.0275 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   0.0246  0.0210         
Implicit tax rate on labor   -0.0043           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial phase of 
unemployment  -0.0039           
Constant  0.1572 -0.1618  -0.0688  -3.7843    
Adjusted R²  0.3594  0.1839  0.2058  -  - 
 
Change in permanent employment  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   0.0492 -0.0127  -0.0208  -0.2214  -0.0217 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0185  0.0072 0.0071  0.0723  0.0071 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   0.0359  0.0203         
Implicit tax rate on labor   0.0031           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial phase of 
unemployment 
-0.0045 
         
Constant  -0.0224  0.0598  0.1498  -1.6712    
Adjusted R²  0.3534 -0.1251  -0.0980  -  - 
 
Change in temporary employment  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   -0.0157  0.0081 0.0117  0.0842  0.0113 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0174  0.0172 0.0173  0.1281  0.0171 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   -0.0178 -0.0090         
Implicit tax rate on labor   0.0006           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial phase of 
unemployment  0.0029           
Constant  0.0304  0.1325  0.0926  -2.1573    
Adjusted R²  -0.5946 -0.2201  -0.1171  -  - 
Sources: EC (2006), OECD (2004 and 2006), Tonin (2005), WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 4.2 - Results of regressions of country dummies on changes in wages, permanent and 
temporary employment for a demand shock 
Change in wages  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   0.1077  0.0618  0.0532  0.4309  0.0481 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0313  0.0219 0.0217 0.1848  0.0206 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   0.0342  0.0216         
Implicit tax rate on labor   -0.0010           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial phase of 
unemployment  -0.0046           
Constant  -0.0096  -0.1495  -0.0537  -3.4442    
Adjusted R²  0.3410  0.1081  0.1408  -  - 
Change in permanent employment  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   0.0270 -0.0466  -0.0567  -0.4958  -0.0619 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0269  0.0150 0.0148  0.1190  0.0149 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   0.0462  0.0255         
Implicit tax rate on labor   0.0043           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial 
phase of unemployment 
-0.0049 
         
Constant  0.0051  0.1514  0.2646  -0.7479    
Adjusted R²  0.4803  0.1463  -0.0980  -  - 
Change in temporary employment  OLS  QML 
   eq1  eq2  eq3  eq4  marg. eff. 
Overall strictness of protection against dismissals (regular 
employment)   -0.0755  0.0098 0.0187  0.1076  0.0174 
Overall strictness of temporary employment regulation  0.0373  0.0429 0.0431  0.2622  0.0425 
Overall strictness of  regulation on collective dismissals   -0.0516 -0.0225         
Implicit tax rate on labor   -0.0094           
Net replacement rate of a single person in the initial 
phase of unemployment  0.0040           
Constant  0.6213  0.1672  0.0673  -2.1953    
Adjusted R²  -0.4583 -0.1474  -0.0598  -  - 
Sources: EC (2006), OECD (2004 and 2006), Tonin (2005), WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 5.1 - Adjustment after a demand shock 
(in %, unweighted data) 
   Marginal effects at the sample mean on: 
   Probability of reducing:  Probability  
of other  
adjustment
1    (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Prices  Costs  Prices and costs 
Low skilled blue collar  0.2  1.6  0.2  -2.0 
High skilled blue collar  2.0  0.5  -1.6  -0.8 
Low skilled white collar  1.7  1.0  1.5  -4.2 
Policy that adapts changes in base wages 
to inflation  -0.3  0.4  2.0  -2.1 
Share of permanent part time employment  1.7  -1.3  3.3  -3.7 
Share of temporary employment  -0.6  -2.0  -1.3  4.0 
Importance of labor costs in total costs  0.3  1.9  -4.0  1.8 
Very likely or likely to follow a competitor's 
price cut  0.5  -9.9  15.9  -6.6 
Collective agreement at the firm level  -0.5  0.3  1.2  -0.9 
Collective agreement signed outside the 
firm   0.7  -1.3  3.3  -2.6 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has base 
wage been frozen over the last 5 years?  -0.4  0.9  2.1  -2.6 
Price flexibility: price changes are not 
concentrated in particular month(s)  1.2  -1.5  -1.6  2.0 
5-19 employees  3.2  -1.0  -3.6  1.4 
20-49 employees  1.5  -1.3  1.3  -1.5 
50-199 employees  1.3  -1.1  0.6  -0.9 
Construction  1.1  -4.0  0.4  2.5 
Trade  0.5  0.6  -1.8  0.8 
Market services  0.9  3.6  -6.8  2.4 
Financial intermediation  -0.4  4.9  -16.7  12.3 
AT  -0.7  9.2  -5.4  -3.1 
CZ  2.9  -5.4  7.3  -4.8 
EE  -1.1  -13.7  24.2  -9.4 
ES  0.2  -21.0  17.8  3.0 
FR  1.2  0.7  2.9  -4.8 
GR  5.6  1.5  -1.3  -5.9 
HU  2.1  11.5  -14.3  0.7 
IT  -0.9  -7.9  17.3  -8.4 
LT  1.9  -11.3  17.5  -8.1 
NL  1.5  2.0  2.3  -5.7 
PL  3.6  -12.9  18.3  -9.0 
PT  -0.4  -9.8  17.1  -6.9 
SI  0.3  -10.2  10.2  -0.3 
Observations  11,085  11,085  11,085  11,085 
Freq. distr. (%)  3.8  17.5  69.4  9.3 
Pseudo R
2  0.1058       
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
2  0.0793       
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. respectively 
IE: did not include the wage shock in it's questionnaire. 
BE: reference country. Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
ES: the possible answers to the question on the reaction to a demand shock were formulated in a slightly different way. The option 
"reduce prices through reducing margins" was considered as a price reduction, the option "reduce prices through reducing costs" as a 
cost reduction and the option "reduce prices through reducing costs and margins" as a price and cost reduction. 
1 Mainly a reduction of margins or output. 
2 The pseudo R
2 of the restricted model is the pseudo R
2 associated to a model that only includes size, sector and country dummies. 36
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Appendix 5.2 - Cost adjustment after a demand shock 
(in %, unweighted data) 

















Low skilled blue collar  -7.1  3.3  1.8  7.9  -5.9 
High skilled blue collar  -3.5  1.2  -0.4  7.3  -4.6 
Low skilled white collar  0.4  4.8  -5.0  -3.5  3.4 
Policy that adapts changes in base 
wages to inflation 
-0.3  -0.4  2.2  -0.3  -1.2 
Share of permanent part time 
employment 
-3.9  -0.6  2.9  5.0  -3.4 
Share of temporary employment  -6.0  -13.7  27.3  0.7  -8.2 
Importance of labor costs in total 
costs 
7.0  11.6  -5.5  -0.8  -12.3 
Very likely or likely to follow a 
competitor's price cut 
1.1  1.3  0.3  0.0  -2.7 
Collective agreement at the firm level  -0.6  -0.3  1.2  0.2  -0.5 
Collective agreement signed outside 
the firm  
-2.2  -3.3  2.8  0.9  1.9 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: has 
base wage been frozen over the last 
5 years? 
3.4  1.7  -0.3  -0.7  -4.2 
5-19 employees  0.1  0.3  -14.0  2.3  11.3 
20-49 employees  -0.2  -0.2  -12.6  1.2  11.8 
50-199 employees  2.2  0.3  -6.9  1.3  3.1 
Construction  5.1  1.2  -4.6  -2.1  0.3 
Trade  2.9  2.1  -7.5  -0.4  3.0 
Market services  4.4  0.9  -4.7  0.0  -0.6 
Financial intermediation  1.4  3.7  -1.5  -4.8  1.2 
AT  4.0  -15.7  -17.8  10.5  18.9 
CZ  7.0  -12.1  -2.6  -6.4  14.0 
EE  6.4  -14.0  -0.9  -6.4  14.9 
ES  5.1  -13.7  29.7  -5.4  -15.7 
FR  1.6  -16.7  6.0  0.0  9.2 
GR  22.5  -0.6  -11.9  18.3  -28.2 
HU  4.0  -20.8  -15.0  -7.4  39.2 
IT  2.5  -9.7  2.5  2.0  2.7 
LT  2.2  -16.6  -5.8  -5.6  25.8 
NL  -3.9  -25.1  19.2  -6.3  16.2 
PL  7.9  -4.4  -15.8  -3.1  15.4 
PT  23.0  -20.3  -9.3  -3.9  10.5 
SI  4.0  -17.8  -10.5  -4.8  29.3 
Observations  8,674  8,674  8,674  8,674  8,674 
Freq. distr. (%)  12.1  12.6  24.9  7.7  42.8 
Pseudo R
2  0.1133       
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
1  0.1005             
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
IE: did not include the wage shock in it's questionnaire.  
BE: reference country. Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
ES: the possible answers to the question on the reaction to a demand shock were formulated in a slightly different way. 
The options "reduce prices through reducing costs" and "reduce prices through reducing costs and margins" were 
considered as a cost adjustment. 
1 The pseudo R
2 of the restricted model is the pseudo R
2 associated to a model that only includes size, sector and 
country dummies. 
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Appendix 5.3 - Adjustment in Belgium after a demand shock 
(in %, unweighted data) 
   Marginal effects at the sample mean on: 
   Probability of reducing:  Probability of 
other 
adjustment
1    
Prices  Costs  Prices and 
costs 
Low skilled blue collar  0.3  -6.0  1.3  4.4 
High skilled blue collar  0.3  6.9  -14.3  7.1 
Low skilled white collar  0.9  8.4  -17.0  7.7 
Share of permanent part time 
employment 
1.0  -2.6  -4.3  5.9 
Share of temporary employment  0.0  -0.2  0.5  -0.3 
Importance of labor costs in total 
costs 
0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.1 
Collective agreement at the firm 
level 
-0.2  1.9  0.9  -2.7 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: 
has base wage been frozen over 
the last 5 years? 
-0.1  2.5  -5.7  3.3 
Price flexibility: price changes are 
not concentrated in particular 
month(s) 
0.1  0.0  -2.1  2.0 
Share of employees that joined the 
firm - share of employees that left 
the firm 
0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.1 
Positive wage cushion: actual 
wages > pay scales 
0.1  -4.4  7.1  -2.8 
Downward real wage rigidity based 
on distribution of individual wage 
changes 
7.2  -11.1  14.6  -10.7 
Profit elasticity   0.2  -0.2  2.4  -2.4 
Firm's employees are covered by 
an all-in clause 
-0.5  2.1  -2.9  1.4 
5-19 employees  -0.1  10.1  -15.2  5.3 
20-49 employees  0.7  0.0  -1.1  0.3 
50-199 employees  0.4  9.8  -10.0  -0.2 
Construction  0.3  -16.3  9.8  6.2 
Trade  -1.1  -2.5  1.5  2.1 
Market services  -0.3  -2.1  5.6  -3.2 
Financial intermediation  -1.7  -4.9  8.8  -2.2 
Observations  1,006  1,006  1,006  1,006 
Freq. distr. (%)  2.7  27.3  59.2  10.7 
Pseudo R
2  0.0528    
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
2  0.0313          
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. respectively. 
Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
1 Mainly a reduction of margins or output. 
2 The pseudo R
2 of the restricted model is the pseudo R
2 associated to a model that only includes size and sector 
dummies. 
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Appendix 5.4 - Cost adjustment in Belgium after a demand shock 
(in %, unweighted data) 















Low skilled blue collar  -3.9  1.5  -0.5  9.7  -6.9 
High skilled blue collar  -0.3  -2.2  9.5  11.1  -18.2 
Low skilled white collar  -0.6  8.6  -13.5  7.0  -1.4 
Share of permanent part time 
employment  -1.9  8.2  1.9  6.1  -14.2 
Share of temporary employment  0.0  -0.3  0.6  0.1  -0.4 
Importance of labor costs in total 
costs  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
Collective agreement at the firm 
level  -0.5  3.2  -0.2  -0.9  -1.7 
Downward nominal wage rigidity: 
has base wage been frozen over the 
last 5 years? 
3.1  8.5  -0.2  -1.2  -10.2 
Share of employees that joined the 
firm - share of employees that left 
the firm 
0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  -0.2 
Positive wage cushion: actual wages 
> pay scales  -0.7  2.0  -4.2  -2.1  5.1 
Downward real wage rigidity based 
on distribution of individual wage 
changes 
-3.1  -25.7  -6.9  -4.5  40.2 
Profit elasticity   -1.2  5.5  -3.3  3.2  -4.1 
No use of alternative strategies 
(other than cut/freeze base wages) 
to reduce labor costs 
-5.6  -8.7  -7.6  -0.7  22.5 
Firm's employees are covered by an 
all-in clause  -0.6  -6.5  5.3  0.5  1.3 
5-19 employees  -2.2  -5.8  -13.6  3.6  18.0 
20-49 employees  -2.0  -8.6  -10.5  4.4  16.7 
50-199 employees  -1.3  -13.5  -2.6  1.0  16.5 
Construction  3.3  11.0  -14.5  -2.3  2.4 
Trade  7.6  -0.5  -16.4  -2.8  12.2 
Market services  -2.7  3.9  -20.1  22.9  -4.0 
Financial intermediation  -4.3  -6.2  -2.9  -5.5  18.9 
Observations  734  734  734  734  734 
Freq. distr. (%)  6.4  27.7  23.4  8.6  33.9 
Pseudo R
2  0.1011         
Pseudo R
2 (restricted model)
1  0.0443         
Sources: WDN, NBB. 
Figures in bold and bold/italique are significant at 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. respectively. 
Manufacturing: reference sector, 200 employees and more: reference size group. 
1 The pseudo R
2 of the restricted model is the pseudo R
2 associated to a model that only includes size and sector 
dummies. 
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